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THE RISE OF TRANSPARENCY
AND THE DECLINE OF SECRECY
IN THE AGE OF
GLOBAL AND SOCIAL MEDIA
P.J. Crowley*
Secrets aren’t what they used to be.
Given news reporting of a wide range of sensitive U.S.
government policies, operations and internal deliberations in recent
years—the National Security Agency terrorist surveillance program
and Central Intelligence Agency black sites during the Bush
administration, the release of thousands of diplomatic cables and
war-related documents by WikiLeaks, the “Olympic Games”1 cyber
attack on Iran’s nuclear sites and details of the raid that killed Osama
bin Laden during the Obama administration and other
counterterrorism operations—there is understandable concern that
these revelations and many more are seriously compromising U.S.
national security.
* Professor of Practice and Fellow, Institute for Public Diplomacy and
Global Communication, George Washington University. From 2009 to 2011, he
served as Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs and Spokesman for the U.S.
Department of State, and from 2011 to 2012 as the General Omar N. Bradley
Chair in Strategic Leadership at the Dickinson School of Law and School of
International Affairs of Pennsylvania State University, Dickinson College and the
United States Army War College.
1 DAVID E. SANGER, CONFRONT AND CONCEAL: OBAMA’S SECRET
WARS AND SURPRISING USE OF AMERICAN POWER 190 (2012).
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These concerns are real, although each case varies in
circumstance and impact. The government has launched an
unprecedented number of investigations and prosecutions.2
Congress is considering additional legislation to try to plug such
leaks.
The government needs a wider range of tools to deal with the
unauthorized disclosure of secret and sensitive information. The
Espionage Act, codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 793-98, was passed in a
different era to address a different problem and may be ill suited to
deal with the present-day dynamic. Legal action, both criminal and
civil, can have a deterrent effect, but this challenge cannot be
legislated and prosecuted away. Realistic expectations are required.
A critical element in the public disclosure of classified
information today is simply that the world has become more
connected, better informed and increasingly transparent. The 2011
bin Laden raid in Abbottabad, Pakistan demonstrates the point.
The discovery of the Al Qaeda leader was one of the most
closely held secrets within the United States government. For
months, only a small circle of government leaders, intelligence
operatives and analysts and eventually special operations forces were
involved in the assessment of available information and the planning
and execution of the operation against “Geronimo.”3
By every indication, the Navy SEALs arrived on the outskirts
of Abbottabad without detection. But while the raid was highly
classified in its planning, it was quite visible in its ultimate execution.
The cloak of secrecy dissolved the moment the SEAL team reached
the compound.

2 Jane Mayer, The Secret Sharer: Is Thomas Drake an Enemy of the State?, NEW
YORKER,
May
23,
2011,
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/
2011/05/23/110523fa_fact_mayer.
3 MARK OWEN WITH KEVIN MAURER, NO EASY DAY: THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A NAVY SEAL: THE FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT OF THE MISSION
THAT KILLED OSAMA BIN LADEN 168 (2012).
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The military plan anticipated dealing with onlookers at the
scene.4 But observers soon lit up on Twitter, conversing about the
unusual late night activity in real time as the mission unfolded.5 The
news of bin Laden’s demise was revealed publicly on Twitter by a
Congressional aide even before the President could get to a White
House podium to announce the news.6
Now the operation is the subject of countless news articles,
movies and books, even one by a former SEAL who participated in
the raid and ostensibly wrote it to “set the record straight.”7 So many
sensitive (although not necessarily classified) details emerged about
the raid in the immediate aftermath, some authorized and others not,
that former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates offered some
strategic communications advice to the White House. Articulated in
more colorful terms, his message: shut up.8
As satisfying as that might be, it is also impractical. In the 21st
century global digital media environment, there is more information
in the hands of more people, now with the ability to communicate
anything from anywhere with the touch of a button. The ability of
any government to control this flow of information, even within its
ranks, in a world with five billion cellphones is greatly diminished.9
President Obama, addressing the United Nations General Assembly,
termed the model of government control of information
“obsolete.”10

Id. at 167.
See SANGER, supra note 1, at 101.
6 Brian Stelter, How the Bin Laden Announcement Leaked Out, N.Y. TIMES
MEDIA DECODER BLOG (May 1, 2012, 11:28 PM), http://mediadecoder.blogs
.nytimes.com/2011/05/01/how-the-osama-announcement-leaked-out/.
7 OWEN, supra note 3, at 297.
8 See SANGER, supra note 1, at 107.
9 PHILIP SEIB, REAL-TIME DIPLOMACY: POLITICS AND POLICY IN THE
SOCIAL MEDIA ERA 9 (2012).
10 Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by the
President to the U.N. General Assembly (Sept. 25, 2012) (transcript available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/25/remarks-president-ungeneral-assembly).
4
5
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In a world increasingly animated by the Internet, Facebook,
Twitter and cellphone cameras—as politicians are discovering—what
might be considered secret or privileged is visible to more people.
People are sharing what they see and hear and think with a wider
audience, and acting and reacting in real time. The recent protests
throughout the Islamic world over an obscure American film trailer
criticizing the Prophet Mohammed is the latest example.
The divide between what is domestic and what is
international has disappeared.
INTERCONNECTED WORLD
This is, as Tom Friedman and Michael Mandelbaum have
termed it, a “hyper-connecting” world, the consequence of
globalization and one or more information revolutions that continue
to reshape the nature of power, international relations and global
politics.11
Some presidential candidates keep talking about building
fences around America, but the connections and the flow of
information and knowledge are ever expanding. Moore’s Law, the
exponential advance of computing power, has an information
corollary, the dramatic expansion in the volume and quality of
available information and the speed with which it can be transmitted.
Given the expanding reach of media, both traditional and
now social media, public opinion has, as we have seen most recently
with the on-going Arab transitions, become increasingly important in
the conduct of foreign policy.12
In a world that is becoming increasingly interactive, the
centers of gravity are civilian populations—protecting them, engaging
them, understanding their history, their culture, their structure and
THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN & MICHAEL MANDELBAUM, THAT USED TO
BE US: HOW AMERICA FELL BEHIND IN THE WORLD IT INVENTED AND HOW WE
CAN COME BACK 65 (2011).
12 MARC LYNCH, THE ARAB UPRISING: THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTIONS
OF THE NEW MIDDLE EAST 199 (2012).
11
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their politics; what worries them, what inspires them, what they want
and what they need; what they think, and what they do; how they
perceive the United States and what they like and don’t like about its
policies.
Modern conflict, as General Rupert Smith suggests, is now
“war amongst the people.”13 If true, it is also “about” the people, a
competition about hearts, minds and ideas. Our ability to pursue our
national interests will increasingly require not only domestic support,
but also international cooperation and understanding. As Joseph Nye
wrote in The Future of Power, it is “the state (or non-states) with the
best story that wins.”14
Public opinion polls have stabilized in recent years, but
international concerns about U.S. policies remain.15 There is a fairly
substantial gap between what the United States tries to do, and how
others view its actions. The United States may be the world’s only
remaining superpower, but it faces competition for global influence
on an increasingly crowded global stage.
This environment includes an array of rising powers, nonstate actors and niche players—call them micro-actors. For the past
two years, WikiLeaks has been one of them.
LEAKS AND WIKILEAKS
Governments leak. They always have and always will. The
digitization of information can make the disclosure of sensitive and
classified information easier, although it also gives law enforcement

13 RUPERT SMITH, THE UTILITY OF FORCE: THE ART OF WAR IN THE
MODERN WORLD xiii (2007).
14 JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., THE FUTURE OF POWER xiii (2011).
15 See Pew Global Attitudes Project, Pakistani Public Opinion Ever More
Critical of U.S., PEW RESEARCH CENTER, June 27, 2012, http://www.pewglobal.
org/2012/06/27/pakistani-public-opinion-ever-more-critical-of-u-s/.
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virtual fingerprints that can help identify the perpetrator.16
Transparency cuts both ways.
What WikiLeaks accomplished in 2010 was unprecedented in
its size and scope: the public release of almost 750,000 documents,
the entire contents of a State Department archive known as the Net
Centric Database, or NCD.17 Many documents were classified or
highly sensitive, involving two active military campaigns and just
about every bilateral relationship the United States has around the
world.
The U.S. government charged Army Private First Class
Bradley Manning with providing the vast trove to Julian Assange
while serving in Iraq. As of late 2012, the military prosecution is
ongoing. If convicted, Manning could serve a lengthy prison term,
perhaps even a life sentence. Assange for his part remains under
investigation by the Department of Justice. Claiming a “war on
whistleblowers,” Assange sought and received asylum from Ecuador
to prevent extradition from Britain to either the United States, or
Sweden where he faces unrelated sexual assault charges.18
Regarding the roughly 251,000 diplomatic cables released
beginning in November 2010, the State Department had three broad
categories of concern.
The first was the potential impact on critical relationships
between the United States and other countries. The release of the
documents undermined that sense of trust that is the bedrock of
effective relationships.

16 Kevin Poulsen & Kim Zetter, ‘I Can’t Believe What I’m Confessing to You’:
The WikiLeaks Chats, WIRED, June 10, 2010, http://www.wired.com/
threatlevel/2010/06/wikileaks-chat/.
17 DAVID LEIGH & LUKE HARDING, WIKILEAKS: INSIDE JULIAN
ASSANGE’S WAR ON SECRECY 74 (2011).
18 Full Transcript of Julian Assange’s Speech Outside Ecuador’s London Embassy,
INDEP. (U.K.), Aug. 19, 2012, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/ uk/homenews/full-transcript-of-julian-assanges-speech-outside-ecuadors-london-embassy8061466.html [hereinafter Assange Speech].
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The second was the lives and livelihoods of people—other
government officials, activists, academics, citizens, even an occasional
journalist—who had talked to a U.S. diplomat sometime in the past.
Lives and careers were placed in jeopardy.
The third was the impact on future statecraft. The NCD
existed specifically to share information more broadly across the
government in the aftermath of 9/11. But government agencies will
only share information when they have confidence it will be
protected.
Now approaching three years since the initial WikiLeaks
revelations, what has been the impact?
It is hard to isolate what happened with WikiLeaks from
other sources of tension that are inherent in many, if not most,
bilateral relationships. Has an activist been jailed because she talked
to an American diplomat or because she was exposing corruption
within an autocratic government? The answer is unknowable, but
could easily be one or both. The WikiLeaks disclosures will remain
part of the background noise of international diplomacy for the
foreseeable future.
While it has undoubtedly produced stresses and strains in
strategic relationships, the sky did not fall.19 There is little evidence it
has handicapped the conduct of U.S. global diplomacy. Some of this
is attributable to hard work by the Obama administration to mitigate
any long-term impact. Over time, the common interests that drive
international relations rose above political pique, although a handful
of ambassadors were replaced due to the candor of their diplomatic
reporting.20

19 See, e.g., MICAH L. SIFRY, WIKILEAKS AND THE AGE OF
TRANSPARENCY 154 (2011) (stating Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
termed the impact as “fairly modest”).
20 See Paul Harris, Wikileaks Has Caused Little Lasting Damage, Says US State
Department,
GUARDIAN,
Jan.
18,
2011,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/
media/2011/jan/19/wikileaks-white-house-state-department; see also U.S. Envoy to
Libya Ensnared in Wikileaks Uproar, REUTERS, Jan. 5, 2011, http://www.reuters.com
/article/2011/01/05/us-libya-usa-idUSTRE7045YX20110105.
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The United States has assisted various individuals in
relocating within autocratic societies to safer ground as a result of
compromised cables. Have people cited in these cables been
physically harmed for what they are doing, including their
interactions with U.S. diplomats? The answer is yes. The government
continues to monitor a large number of cases and has interceded
repeatedly when individuals cited in cables have been threatened and
detained.21
There remains a risk that information will be pushed back
into agency silos, either through reduced circulation of cable traffic—
the State Department unplugged the NCD from one classified
network after the compromise—or the use of other narrower
reporting channels. Over the past couple of years, any foreign
diplomat who engages his or her American counterpart has likely
thought of WikiLeaks during the course of the conversation.
Did WikiLeaks raise legitimate questions about the conduct
of U.S. policy in specific locations? Yes. For example, one cable
revealed the willingness of the former leader of Yemen to deceive his
own people about the nature of joint counter-terrorism operations,
with at least the tacit agreement of U.S. officials, and raised the risk
of deceiving the American people in the process.22
Did it change history? Not really. For example, the dramatic
transitions in the Middle East and North Africa are not Wiki
revolutions although revelations undoubtedly validated popular
grievances that were widely shared prior to 2010. The release of
cables in Tunisia through TuniLeaks gave demonstrations added
momentum.23 Interestingly, WikiLeaks has had minimal impact in
authoritarian societies lacking a significant global media presence.
State-controlled media largely ignored the story.

See THE NEW YORK TIMES STAFF, OPEN SECRETS: WIKILEAKS, WAR,
AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 241 (Alexander Star ed., 2011).
21
22
23

See id. at 81-82.
See id. at 19.
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How WikiLeaks is viewed as a phenomenon depends on the
lens through which it is viewed, whether a case of freedom of the
press, whistleblowing, secrecy or transparency.
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
Standing on a balcony of the Ecuadorian embassy in London
in August 2012, Julian Assange criticized the ongoing Justice
Department investigation of WikiLeaks as a witch-hunt against
“journalists for shining a light on the secret crimes of the powerful.”24
Notwithstanding Assange’s efforts to portray WikiLeaks in
terms of freedom of the press—governments are not the only entities
adept at “spin”—the frame is not really valid.
The United States government never questioned the right of
the media, such as The New York Times and other mainstream outlets,
to publish stories based on classified and sensitive documents in their
possession.25 Unlike the Pentagon Papers case,26 which also involved
The New York Times and was ultimately settled by the Supreme Court,
the government did not seek an injunction to preempt publication.
The approach to WikiLeaks was different. The State
Department Legal Advisor, Harold Koh, sent a letter to its legal
representative requesting that WikiLeaks destroy rather than post on
the Internet the diplomatic cables it had acquired.27 The U.S.
government viewed Assange (and WikiLeaks) as a political actor, not
a journalist. Ironically, so did some within WikiLeaks itself.28

Assange Speech, supra note 18.
See generally THE NEW YORK TIMES STAFF, supra note 21 at 15, 241-243
(providing insight into the U.S. government’s reaction to potential publication of
classified information).
26 See generally New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)
(denying the government an injunction against The New York Times, which was
permitted to publish classified Pentagon papers).
27 See LEIGH & HARDING, supra note 17, at 192-193.
28 DANIEL DOMSCHEIT-BERG, INSIDE WIKILEAKS: MY TIME WITH
JULIAN ASSANGE AT THE WORLD’S MOST DANGEROUS WEBSITE 162 (2011).
24
25
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Interestingly, so did the mainstream media. Bill Keller, The
New York Times’ editor at the time, considered Assange “a source.”29
His counterpart at The Guardian, Davis Leigh, termed him a
“publisher-intermediary.”30
This distinction was also evident in the respective approaches
of the mainstream media and WikiLeaks to the release of documents.
WikiLeaks eventually posted the entire archive on the Internet
without context and with little effort to protect the safety of civilians
identified in the cables.31 On the other hand, the mainstream media
recognized both the potential danger to individual sources and to
some extent to national security interests. Media outlets withheld
some information, mostly civilian names but some intelligence
information as well, while reporting carefully and credibly on the
material, attempting to put issues in broader context.32
Notwithstanding
these
contrasting
approaches—the
complete transparency advocated by WikiLeaks vs. selective
disclosure by the mainstream media—it is virtually impossible to
separate Julian Assange’s actions from those of the journalists and
news outlets with which he partnered. While existing law could
support a credible legal case against not just the perpetrator of a leak
but a recipient and co-conspirator as well, the costs of such a
prosecution potentially outweigh the benefits. It would undoubtedly
compromise the credibility of the United States as a key advocate for
freedom of the press in authoritarian societies around the world.
What helped WikiLeaks achieve global impact was not just
the breadth of the diplomatic documents it acquired, but the global
media partnership it built with The New York Times, The Guardian, Le
Monde, Der Spiegel and El Pais, adding other major news outlets
around the world including Al Jazeera over time.33 This is “networked
journalism,” bringing together a broad array of mainstream media,
non-governmental organizations and citizen journalists, employing
29
30
31
32
33

THE NEW YORK TIMES STAFF, supra note 21, at 20.
LEIGH & HARDING, supra note 17, at 7.
See DOMSCHEIT-BERG, supra note 28, at 183.
THE NEW YORK TIMES STAFF, supra note 21, at 14.
See, e.g., LEIGH & HARDING, supra note 17, at 10.
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the latest information and connective technologies (including high
speech search capabilities to make huge volumes of information
intelligible), sharing information and reporting deliberately over
months rather than days. For reasons both technological and
economic, this global media model is certain to be repeated in the
future.
Similar synergies were evident during the Arab Awakening,
where governments from Tunisia and Libya to Egypt and Syria were
unable to block the exchange of information through the Internet
and social media that empowered civilian populations to overturn the
status quo. Global media, including satellite television, documented
unfolding events; showing state-sponsored violence against
protesters, and generating international support.34 Egypt literally tried
to disconnect itself from the outside world, but the networks and
infrastructure were too robust and resilient.35
WHISTLEBLOWING
Is Bradley Manning a whistleblower? Many believe he is, and
that he is entitled to protection rather than prosecution. On the other
hand, the sheer volume of the documents Manning is alleged to have
passed to Assange—far more than any individual could absorb—
tends to undercut that claim.
Central to the concept of whistleblowing is both expertise in
the subject matter and the ability to judge that, in releasing certain
information to expose wrongdoing or generate public debate about
specific policies, the benefits outweigh risks associated with the leak.
Daniel Ellsberg, arguably the best modern day manifestation
of a whistleblower for his role in The Pentagon Papers, worked directly
on the analysis that detailed a flawed strategy in Vietnam. He
attempted to work within the system but in the end, he felt he had no
choice but to expose the report that he earnestly felt could result in a
change of policy.

34
35

See LYNCH, supra note 12, at 68-69.
See SEIB, supra note 9, at 41-44.

251

2012

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

1:2

Using the available technology in the late ‘60s, Ellsberg
photocopied volumes of material and made them available to The
New York Times.36 On the other hand, while serving in a war zone,
Manning is alleged to have downloaded a digital file onto a Lady
Gaga CD (the computer drives that enabled this to occur were
supposed to be disabled but were not) and with a few strokes of the
keyboard forwarded it to Assange.37
Whether WikiLeaks is the wave of the future or a one-hit
wonder remains to be seen. But technology enables journalists and
public advocates to establish connections deep within government
bureaucracies, making the leak of a large file or small detail easier to
accomplish.
Leaks can occur, as with WikiLeaks, because someone
perceives wrongdoing or wants to set information free. They can also
involve bureaucratic rivalries, a desire to advance a policy or set the
record straight. They are likely to happen with growing frequency for
multiple reasons.
The media reporting on national security issues today are for
the most part more experienced, professional and connected. Their
rolodexes are extensive and include relationships not just with U.S.
officials but with foreign leaders as well. Journalists, civilian
politicians and policymakers have been on campaigns together.
Journalists, junior and senior military officials and even intelligence
analysts have been in war zones together. Given the evolution of the
non-stop 24/7-news cycle and its intensive focus on Washington,
government officials pay attention, take journalists’ calls and respond
to their emails and text messages.
Far more often, so-called leaks result not because of hidden
agendas but through extensive reporting using this robust network of
sources, which provides access to both operational and strategic-level
information.

DANIEL ELLSBERG, SECRETS: A MEMOIR OF VIETNAM AND THE
PENTAGON PAPERS 372 (2002).
37 See LEIGH & HARDING, supra note 17, at 22.
36
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SECRECY
Max Frankel, the Washington bureau chief for The New York
Times, said in a deposition regarding the Pentagon Papers, “when the
government loses a secret or two, it simply adjusts to a new reality.”38
But WikiLeaks involved much more than a “secret or two.”
Are there too many secrets? The answer is probably yes, but in many
ways, this is the wrong question.
most.

Take one of the cables that received more attention than

A number of stories quoted an exchange between a Gulf
monarch and a high level U.S. government official.39 It is well known
that the Gulf monarchies are greatly concerned about a more
ambitious and assertive Iran, one that has an active nuclear program.
The king’s view was clear: military action will be required, and the
sooner the better.40
Should conversations like that be confidential? Most would
answer, yes. The fact is, more of these diplomatic conversations are
happening than ever before.
In today’s world, more countries are taking active roles on the
international stage—the United Nations added its 193rd member this
year, South Sudan. With the end of the Cold War and advent of
globalization, the United States is literally doing business with almost
all of them. And more issues, from economics and energy to global
health and climate change, fit under the rubric of national security. At
the State Department alone, diplomats around the world now

THE NEW YORK TIMES STAFF, supra note 21, at 18.
See generally Tally Helfont, E-Notes: WikiLeaks in the Arab Press,
FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, Feb. 2011, http://www.fpri.org/
enotes/201102.helfont.wikileaks.html.
40 THE NEW YORK TIMES STAFF, supra note 21, at 474.
38
39
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generate more than one million cables and two billion emails each
year, many of them confidential.41
Some suggest there should be fewer secrets. This is
unrealistic.
Businesses have proprietary information—Coca Cola has its
secret formula and Google its secret algorithm. These secrets are
crucial to maintaining a competitive advantage. Governments are no
different, up to a point.
In the national security world, broad categories of activity
should be properly restricted—most advocates of more transparent
government recognize this—military operations, weapon capabilities,
intelligence operations, diplomatic communications, and critical
infrastructure would be good examples.
A democracy with no secrets is a society that will rapidly
cease to function. Naked transparency, as Lawrence Lessig wrote not
long ago in The New Republic, would push our political system over
the cliff.42
There must be a balance. But government can do better.
TRANSPARENCY
If there needs to be a zone of confidentiality, one that rightly
pertains to national security where governments should be given
latitude to conduct diplomacy, and plan and execute military
operations, then there must be a corresponding zone of
accountability that ensures citizens are properly informed about the
actions of government and that subjects government to genuine
oversight.

William McAllister, The Documentary Big Bang, the Digital Records
Revolution, and the Future of the Historical Profession, 41 PASSPORT 12 (2010).
42 Lawrence Lessig, Against Transparency: The Perils of Openness in
Government, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 9, 2009, http://www.tnr.com/article/books-andarts/against-transparency.
41
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At a certain level, the United States is transparent. There is
now an intensive 24/7 media climate that surrounds government.
Government hearings and floor debates are televised, although a case
can be made that television may actually be a contributing factor in
the growing ineffectiveness of government institutions.
Yet, since 9/11, there has been a discernible push towards
less government transparency and less public debate about critical
security issues. Information has been removed from public websites
based on a concern, legitimate up to a point, that potential
adversaries can exploit it. Critical infrastructure is a good example—a
cable analyzing global critical infrastructure was one of the most
sensitive documents released by WikiLeaks.43
There are institutional ways in which government can
encourage proper accountability while protecting those details that
are truly the most sensitive—strengthening the role of oversight
bodies within government, declassifying information more rapidly,
and improving its responsiveness to freedom of information
requests.
Another is simply recognizing that, in a more transparent
world and where public opinion can be more strategic, there is a need
to communicate more, to engage global publics more aggressively
and forthrightly. A good example regards counter-terrorism
operations, specifically the use of drones.
According to published accounts, drone strikes in 2011 killed
three American citizens, Anwar al-Awlaki, a rising leader within Al
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); Samir Kahn, an Al Qaeda
in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) propagandist and editor of the
online magazine Inspire; and Awlaki’s 16-year old son, Abdulrahman.

Mark Clayton, WikiLeaks List of ‘Critical’ Sites: Is it a ‘Menu for Terrorists’?,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 6, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.
com/USA/Foreign-Policy/2010/1206/WikiLeaks-list-of-critical-sites-Is-it-a-menufor-terrorists.
43
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In the case of Anwar al-Awlaki, U.S. President Obama
confirmed the airstrike that killed him.44 While the administration has
publicly discussed the legal foundations for ongoing counterterrorism operations in a series of speeches by senior officials, it has
not released its legal analysis justifying the action outside a court of
law and without due process.45
Awlaki’s leadership role in AQAP and participation in AQAP
operational planning, not to mention his encouragement of further
attacks against the United States, are a strong basis to conclude he
was a clear threat to the United States and a legitimate target. And
there are ample legal authorities to justify the action, particularly the
2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF).46
But expressly because this involved an American citizen
outside a declared war zone and without due process, the
government is obligated to come forward with sufficient information
to give the American people confidence that the action was
consistent with the laws of war and existing authorities.
Another example involves Pakistan. Secretary of Defense
Leon Panetta, in a speech in New Delhi acknowledged that “We are
fighting a war in the FATA,” referring to Pakistan’s federally
administered tribal areas where core al Qaeda’s remaining leaders and
key allies are located.47

44 Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by the
President at the “Change of Office” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Ceremony (Sept. 30, 2011) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2011/09/30/remarks-president-change-office-chairman-jointchiefs-staff-ceremony).
45 See, e.g., John O. Brennan, Chief Counterterrorism Advisor, Speech at
the Wilson Center: The Ethics and Efficacy of the President’s Counterterrorism
Strategy (Apr. 30, 2012) (transcript available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/
event/the-efficacy-and-ethics-us-counterterrorism-strategy).
46 See DANIEL KLAIDMAN, KILL OR CAPTURE: THE WAR ON TERROR
AND THE SOUL OF THE OBAMA PRESIDENCY 265 (2012).
47 Leon Panetta, Secretary of Defense, Remarks by Secretary Panetta at
the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi, India (June 6, 2012)
(transcript available at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?
transcriptid=5054).
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The U.S. government considers the details of individual
drone strikes as classified, even though the results of these drone
operations are well known to the Pakistani public, reported by
Pakistani media and catalogued by various web sites.48
While Pakistan’s military and intelligence services know more
about the drone strikes than is publicly acknowledged, its civilian
government has publicly called for drone strikes to end.49 The United
States has ignored these demands, despite the fact that strengthening
civilian governance in Pakistan is considered crucial to defeating the
extremist threat in that country.50
What was once a shared struggle against Al Qaeda now is
viewed as “America’s war” within and even against Pakistan.
According to the latest Pew Global Attitudes Project poll, the U.S.
approval rating within the Pakistani public is only 11 percent, lower
than perceptions of al Qaeda.51 Seven in ten Pakistanis now view the
United States as an enemy.52
To the United States, the drone program, which the Obama
administration only recently acknowledged publicly, is seen as an
essential counterterrorism tool.53 But in a recent Pew poll, only two
A number of web sites track drone operations. One example is the
“Year of the Drone” analysis done by the New America Foundation through its
Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative, http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/
drones.
49 See generally James Cavallaro et al., Living Under Drones: Death, Injury and
Trauma to Civilians from U.S. Drone Practices in Pakistan, Sept. 2012,
http://livingunderdrones.org/download-report/. See also Conor Friedersdorf,
‘Every Person is Afraid of the Drones’: The Strikes’ Effect on Life In Pakistan, ATLANTIC,
Sept.
25,
2012,
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/
2012/09/every-person-is-afraid-of-the-drones-the-strikes-effect-on-life-in-pakistan
/262814/.
50 See, e.g., SANGER, supra note 1, at 88.
51 See Pew Global Attitudes Project, supra note 51.
52 Id.
53 See generally Greg Miller, Brennan Speech is First Obama Acknowledgment of
Use
of
Armed
Drones,
WASH.
POST,
Apr.
30,
2012,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/brennan-speech-isfirst-obama-acknowledgement-of-use-of-armed-drones/2012/04/30/gIQAq7B4rT
_story.html.
48
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countries surveyed—the United States and India—had positive
attitudes towards the use of drones. Eighteen countries were
opposed, many by significant margins.54
The United States has a right of self-defense, but the secrecy
is counterproductive. It prevents the U.S. government from
explaining the justification for the action, who the target was and
why. This inhibits the ability of the United States to develop the
public support needed to sustain its counterterrorism policies and
actions over time. The resulting void provides propaganda
opportunities for adversaries that they have exploited, particularly
regarding alleged civilian casualties due to drone operations. Such
excessive secrecy imposes significant strategic costs on these
operations.
MORE COMMUNICATION, NOT LESS
America commands the global stage, but technology has
largely removed the costs and barriers of entry into what is now a
global conversation. As the United States seeks to act, to be heard
and to be understood, there are many more voices with competing
narratives that will influence global perceptions of the United States,
its policies and its actions.
In this real-time, complex and unpredictable environment,
the temptation within government is to communicate less. In fact, it
needs to communicate more.
Some in government believe the current struggle to be
understood as a matter of better messaging. That’s too simplistic.
Communicating is about more than policy pronouncements. It is
about the policies themselves—what the United States does or
doesn’t do; whether its actions match its words; and whether or not it
can achieve common cause with others.

Pew Global Attitudes Project, Global Opinion of Obama Slips, International
Policies
Faulted,
PEW
RESEARCH
CENTER,
June
13,
2012,
http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/06/13/global-opinion-of-obama-slipsinternational-policies-faulted/.
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Going forward, the United States will never act alone.
Whatever it does, billions will be watching, and reacting, in real time.
If the United States fails to keep pace, it will struggle to gain the
international understanding and support required to succeed.
Global public opinion is becoming more strategic. The
United States cannot afford to lead from behind.
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